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The struggles of precarious youth in Tunisia: The case 
of the Kerkennah movement  
 
Lorenzo Feltrin, University of Warwick, UK 
 
Abstract  
This article analyses the origins and the dynamics of the social movement against the 
energy corporation Petrofac that took place in the Tunisian archipelago of Kerkennah 
between 2011 and 2016. The Kerkennah movement is seen as part of a broader cycle of 
mobilisations for social justice that started in 2008 and continues to the present day. The 
main subjects of these mobilisations are young people lacking sources of regular income 
and their core demands are secure employment and local development. It is argued that 
communal solidarities were key in compensating for the lack of occupational cohesion 
among the protesters. 
 
Introduction 
In January 2016, Tunisia witnessed a nationwide wave of mobilisations following the 
suicide of unemployed graduate Ridha Yahyaoui during a protest for employment. The 
protagonists of the unrest were young people excluded from secure employment and 
regular sources of income. This rapid escalation of turmoil could not but remind us of the 
protests that, five years before, ignited the Arab Spring. Tunisia was in fact the first 
country in the region where popular mobilisations toppled the head of state, starting a 
cascade of revolts that quickly diffused from Morocco to Iraq. Of course, by 2016 the 
Tunisian political institutional framework had turned from a highly rigid dictatorship to a 
representative democracy, but the demands for secure employment and local 
development of the marginal regions remained eerily unchanged. In fact, while the 2011 
Uprising achieved a level of civil and political rights never before seen in Tunisia, it was 
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clearly unable to set the country on a more socially inclusive developmental path. 
Moreover, political instability and terrorist attacks aggravated the economic downturn, 
leading to a worse standard of living for most Tunisians.  
In this context, on 19 January 2016 in the Tunisian fishing archipelago of Kerkennah, a 
group of unemployed graduates set up a roadblock at the Petrofac gas field, bringing 
production to a halt. They demanded that the Jersey-registered British extractive 
corporation contribute to employment and development on the islands. This article 
presents their movement as a case study for the analysis of the struggles of the precarious 
youth in Tunisia. The Kerkennah movement is particularly interesting both for its 
representativeness and for its specificities. It is representative because of the social 
composition of its core participants (young people in precarious employment), its 
demands (secure employment and local development), and its main forms of collective 
action (the roadblock and the riot). This allows for some insight into similar 
contemporary episodes of social unrest across the country, like the protests that have 
more recently blocked some gas and oil extraction sites in the southern regions of 
Tataouine and Kebili. It is specific because it was relatively durable, which helps to 
identify some of the conditions for protracted mobilisation of youth living in precarious 
circumstances. It will be argued that deeply entrenched communal solidarities were an 
important ingredient for the sustainability of the movement.  
The first section of the article briefly reviews the recent literature on post-Arab Spring 
workers’ mobilisations in North Africa and builds a theoretical framework to interpret the 
case under study. Against this background, the second section presents a historical 
account of the composition and struggles of the Tunisian working class, while the third 
section provides a narrative and an interpretation of the Kerkennah movement up to 
September 2016. The article is based on country-level empirical PhD research on 
Tunisian workers’ mobilisations, including 53 semi-structured interviews and an 
extensive digitised document archive, and additional collection of materials specific to 
Kerkennah. These include semi-structured interviews with 13 interviewees conducted 
during two fieldwork visits to the islands, online archival research on press articles, a 
collection of relevant statements and agreements, and socioeconomic statistics.  
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Work in a world of robots: Understanding precarity and unwaged labour  
With the debate on the different trajectories of the Arab Spring protests, there has been a 
revival of interest in workers’ mobilisations in North Africa, with monographs showing 
how the balance of class power was an important ingredient in the outcomes of the 
uprisings (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; Beinin 2016; Yousfi 2015). These authors are 
well aware of the problems arising from precarity, but their main focus is on waged 
workers organised in trade unions. Some academic work putting precarious workers at 
the centre of analysis has also emerged (Ayeb and Bush 2012; Bayat 2015; Bono et al. 
2015). The current article is, however, innovative in three ways: it deploys a ‘heretical’ 
Marxist framework broadening the concept of working class to include all precarious 
workers; in this light it provides a historical narrative of class struggles in Tunisia 
comparing the current cycle to the one that took place in the 1970s and early 1980s; and 
it presents new empirical material on the Kerkennah movement.  
The origins of the precarity concept do not lie far from Tunisia, as they are to be found in 
Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of work and workers in pre-Independence Algeria (Bourdieu 
et al. 1963). Disturbingly, the arbitrariness and anxiety endured by many precarious 
workers in today’s Tunisia are in several respects a déjà vu of Bourdieu’s ‘sellers of 
nothing for nothing’1 (Bourdieu et al. 1963, 298) who crowded the Algerian streets in an 
attempt to raise an income in the absence of more stable alternatives. However, the 
account that follows shows that there are also important differences. Remarkably – while 
in Bourdieu’s time a degree guaranteed a way out of precarity by virtue of its rarity 
(Bourdieu et al. 1963, 272) – the unemployed graduates are now a salient element of 
North African labour markets and politics.  
The issue of precarity was revitalised in the early 2000s by the global justice movement – 
especially in Mediterranean Europe – and by its associated intellectuals, who rooted their 
understanding of it in the decline of the Fordist system of standardised manufacturing and 
secure employment and in the rise of immaterial labour, in which workers perform tasks 
characterised by a centrality of knowledge, information, affect, and communication (see, 
for example, Hardt and Negri 2004).2 However, immaterial labour cannot be seen as 
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hegemonic in many contemporary global South struggles (Federici 2008). In Tunisia, 
while educational levels have risen over time, opportunities for qualified employment 
have not increased at the same rate, and thus the influence of immaterial labour is limited 
and cannot provide the main infrastructure for mobilisation.  
In English-speaking academia, the best-known use of the precarity concept is Guy 
Standing’s successful book The precariat (2011). While using the term, Standing 
detached it from the militant milieus from which it had re-emerged. His interpretation is 
especially problematic in considering those in precarious employment as a separate class, 
outside the working class. But, as Erik Olin Wright (2016) has shown, precarious and 
secure workers are best seen as part of the same class because of the overall convergence 
of their interests vis-à-vis the economic elite.  
This article stands on two main theoretical axes. Aaron Benanav’s work on the expansion 
of the ‘surplus population’ since the post-World War II period is adopted to make sense 
of precarity, while the autonomist tradition of class composition analysis is used to 
understand unwaged labour. These approaches share several fundamental assumptions, 
but tensions exist between them, forcing careful use of their concepts.  
The US-based Marxist scholar Aaron Benanav explains the global rise of precarity as the 
result of an increase in the supply of labour due to rapid demographic growth and the 
global fall of subsistence agriculture in recent decades, combined with a decline in the 
demand for labour due to slow economic growth accompanied by automation of 
production (Benanav 2015a; Benanav 2015b). An effect of automation was the secular 
decline in the global share of agricultural employment. Until the 1970s, the losses of 
agricultural employment were at least partially offset by the increase in industrial jobs. 
But industry is also subject to high levels of automation, which contributes to explaining 
why in recent decades the global share of workers employed in industry has in fact not 
grown. Contrary to widespread perceptions, the share of industrial employment has 
declined or stagnated also in most of the global South, and China seems to be no 
exception (Chuang 2016). The tertiary sector (i.e. the service sector) thus has to bear all 
the employment burden of workers evacuated from agriculture and industry. But most 
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services have turned out not to be amenable to quick productivity gains and therefore 
cannot deliver the high GDP growth rates that would be needed for employment losses to 
be temporarily recuperated.  
These trends have far-reaching consequences. In many global South countries that have 
never reached levels of industrialisation comparable to the West, workers are being 
thrown directly from agricultural employment into the tertiary sector. For the vast 
majority of them, this does not mean a highly paid job in finance or creative work in the 
media industry, but insecure toil in low-end services, often informal and/or self-
employed. Therefore, there is no universal and linear three-stage model of development, 
in which all countries necessarily and gradually move from being centred on agriculture 
to industry and finally to services. In a world market saturated with cheap industrial 
goods, very late industrialisers within the system of global capitalism may well turn out 
not to be industrialisers at all, in the sense that they may never reach the share of 
industrial employment that obtained in Western countries at its peak.  
In exactly the same way that automation augments the productivity of those workers who 
remain in core production, it makes an increasing proportion of workers relatively less 
necessary to it. This is the surplus population, living under precarious employment and 
therefore with irregular access to income. In countries where there are no unemployment 
subsidies adequate to make a living, the surplus population still has to work in order to 
gain access to the means of mere survival. ‘Unemployment’ is often a cultural construct 
signifying that somebody is not engaged in the kind of work to which she feels entitled 
by prevailing social norms resulting from previous struggles. The category ‘unemployed’ 
is therefore misleading here, since we are mostly dealing with people actually performing 
casual work with widely varying hours of work.3 The label ‘precarious workers’ will thus 
be preferred to designate most members of the surplus population. Precarious workers 
pose latent or active pressures on the relatively secure workers, eroding their bargaining 
power and thus blurring the sociological frontier between precarious and secure 
workforce. Precarity spreads across sectors and subjects, undermining or weakening the 
forms of consciousness and organisation that characterised the age of expanding 
industrial employment.  
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Precarisation, informalisation, and the expansion of the service sector (or tertiarisation) 
are mutually reinforcing phenomena but they should not be confused. Precarity refers to 
insecure employment incapable of providing a regular income; it thus exists in both the 
informal and the formal sectors and in agriculture and industry as well as in the service 
sector. Of course, rising precarity is not a deterministic ‘law’ any more than rising 
automation. Indeed, in the post-World War II period many countries – including Tunisia 
– saw the advent of a social pact providing sources of regular income for some sections 
of the population. This period, however, can be regarded as exceptional in the history of 
capitalism and dependent on a series of specific conditions. Since the 1970s, the social 
pact has continuously deteriorated and no inversion of the tendency is in sight.  
But who are the subjects of precarity? At this point the autonomist tradition comes in (for 
English-language accounts, see Dyer-Witherford 1999, and Wright 2002). In the 1960s, 
the Italian ‘pre-autonomists’ (known as operaisti or workerists) shifted the focus of 
analysis from capital to class, from the structures of capital’s ‘objective laws’ to the 
agency of subjective class struggles. They thus concentrated on the study of historically 
specific class composition. The precarious are part of the class composition because they 
are forced to sell – directly or indirectly – their labour power to capital, even if there is 
nobody to buy it enduringly. Class is defined here by dispossession, not by exploitation. 
However, there is an array of ways through which capital can extract value from the work 
of segments of the surplus population even bypassing the wage relation (see van der 
Linden 2014). Autonomist feminists held that housewives are also exploited by capital 
because they perform unpaid work producing and reproducing that peculiar commodity 
that is labour power (Dalla Costa and James 1972). Their insights were later applied to 
unwaged peasants in the global South (Cleaver 1976) and to ‘self-employed’ workers in 
the North (Bologna and Fumagalli 1997). Moreover, the autonomist feminist 
understanding of the realm of social reproduction as integrated within the circuit of 
capital accumulation opened the way to seeing the sites of social reproduction, the 
community, as sites of class struggles (see Haider and Mohandesi 2015).  
Manifold examples of exploitation outside the wage relation can be found in the Tunisian 
society. For instance, the many Tunisian ‘unemployed’ graduates who provide informal 
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private tutoring participate in the production of the labour power of their pupils just as 
housewives participate in the production of the labour power of their children. In 
Kerkennah, most male unemployed graduates actually work as fishers just like many 
other men in the islands. Self-employed fishers sell their product to wholesale and food-
processing companies who appropriate part of the value they produce. These types of 
‘dependent self-employed’ workers are better viewed in the way that Marx saw 
smallholding peasants in the 19th century: ‘The smallholding of the peasant is only a 
means for capitalists to draw profit, interest, and rent from the soil, leaving to the farmer 
himself how to extract his wages’ (Marx 1852, 120). The unwaged are also exploited by 
financial capital; in fact, many of them have to go into debt in order to gain access to the 
meagre means of production they use (see Lazzarato 2011).  
By placing the roots of the plight of the Tunisian precarious youth within the global 
dynamics of capitalist development and by explaining how these social subjects are 
indeed part of a broadly conceived working class, this theoretical framework allows us to 
understand the mobilisations of the precarious for socioeconomic rights as class struggle, 
and to see how the intersection of communal and class solidarities can in some contexts 
acquire a prominent role relative to ostensibly more ‘traditional’ forms of workers’ 
mobilisation. 
 
Tunisian class composition: A historical analysis  
Tunisian sectoral employment trends are in line with the global tendencies described 
above. Between 1961 and 2014, agricultural employment fell from 45% to 15% of total 
employment, and service sector employment rose from 30% to 51% of total employment. 
Industrial employment (including construction, mining, energy and water) started at 24% 
and kept growing until 1981, after which it remained at 33–34%. The growth of industrial 
employment was entirely due to the growth of employment in manufacturing, which rose 
from 7% in 1961 to 19% in the mid 1980s. After that it stayed between 18% and 20%.4  
These data also show that in Tunisia manufacturing in part compensated for the secular 
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decline in agricultural employment up to the 1970s. Since the 1980s, the burden of 
absorbing the workers expelled from the land fell entirely on the shoulders of the service 
sector. Employment in manufacturing remained at the same level quantitatively but 
changed qualitatively. Relatively secure employment in the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) declined, and precarious employment in private-sector light manufacturing for 
export increased.  
Figure 1 – Total employment by economic sector (Tunisia, 1961-2014)  
 
Employment in the public administration5 grew from 13% of total employment in 1961 
to 17–18% in the mid 1980s, after which it remained at the same level until the Uprising. 
The burden of expanding employment opportunities therefore fell entirely on the 
shoulders of the private service sector. To a much larger extent than in Western countries, 
most new employment in services has little to do with qualified cognitive and creative 
work and means a wide and fragmented array of deskilled jobs in highly precarious 
conditions that provide very limited income. The informal economy is estimated to 
employ 32% of the Tunisian employed population, and 57% of those working in the 
informal economy are unwaged (Ben Cheikh 2016).  
Kerkennah in part distinguishes itself from the national picture because a large proportion 
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of the employed, 42%, works in ‘agriculture and fishing’ (INS 2016a). This is due to the 
dominance of fishing in the local economy. Despite Petrofac’s presence, industrial 
employment on the islands, at 15%, is less than half of the national figure. In fact, 
production on the extractive field is highly technological and requires very few workers, 
only about 80 according to the local union.6 There are also 55 security workers hired 
through a local agency.  
The Tunisian workforce also follows the global tendencies towards rising levels of 
education and increasing female participation in official employment. For instance, the 
number of Tunisian university graduates grew from a mere 564 after Independence in 
1956 (Ben Romdhane 2011, 150) to 1,116,000 in 2012 (INS 2013). But the expansion of 
higher education was not matched by an expansion of employment for those with 
educational qualifications. Even according to official statistics, between 1994 and the 
present the unemployment rate for university graduates jumped from 4% (INS 1995) to 
32% (INS 2016b). Almost in line with the national figure of 21%, university graduates in 
Kerkennah make up 19.5% of the employed population (INS 2016a). Unemployed 
graduate numbers in Kerkennah were estimated at around 500 in 2011, and have now 
increased to around 700. It should be remembered, however, that someone is socially 
considered an unemployed graduate even if she is working, as long as the conditions that 
characterise her job fall below what is normally held to be the appropriate minimum for 
the level of education she has attained.  
Women moved from 6% of Tunisia’s official economically active population in 1966 
(INS 1966) to 29% in 2016 (INS 2016b). As everywhere, women in Tunisia face 
gendered oppression at work and in the broader society. In addition to housework, 
women are over-proportionally represented in some of the most vulnerable manual 
sectors of the economy: in 2012, for instance, women constituted 72% of employment in 
the textile sector (INS 2013). Women also often endure routine violations of basic labour 
legislation, particularly in the area of light manufacturing for export. In Kerkennah, 
women are 21.5% of the official economically active population, although this figure 
hides unpaid housework, small subsistence farming and activities auxiliary to fishing, 
like the production or maintenance of fishing nets.  
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The Tunisian workforce is also stratified along ethnic lines. Immigration from abroad is a 
relatively small phenomenon, but internal migrations have been historically significant, 
mostly from the interior to the coastal regions like Greater Tunis, the Sahel and Sfax, 
where many migrants are employed in light manufacturing and tourism (see Touhami 
2012). Tunisia too has its racist name – ‘jabri’ – to stigmatise migrants from the 
marginalised regions. This epithet, much like its Italian equivalent ‘terrone’, associates 
geographical origin to negative connotations of peasantry, ignorance, and impoliteness. 
Kerkennah is also characterised by high emigration rates, but immigrants from the 
interior regions of Tunisia are present on the islands, especially in construction.  
These macro-level changes in the Tunisian workforce were not a natural and conflict- 
free evolution from agricultural to service employment. In the 1960s, under the ‘socialist’ 
government led by Ahmed Ben Salah, Tunisia engaged in a programme of import-
substitution industrialisation with the creation of several heavy-industry SOEs, while the 
traditional agricultural sector was modernised through a system of state-run 
‘cooperatives’. In 1970, the regime switched towards liberal economic policy, striving to 
expand the private sector, attract foreign investment and produce for export. But the state 
maintained a strong role as asset owner and leader of investment.  
The 1970s witnessed a major global cycle of struggles and Tunisia was no exception. We 
can conventionally place the beginning of this broad cycle from the start of the strike 
wave in 1971 to the repression of the main trade union (the Union générale tunisienne du 
travail, UGTT, or General Workers’ Union of Tunisia) in 1985. While precarious 
workers also mobilised, the protagonists of this cycle were a new generation of educated 
workers and the young elements of the waged middle class that radicalised leftwards in 
the student movement and then entered the workforce and the UGTT at the same time 
(see Hamzaoui 1984). These workers, supported by the UGTT left, and in many cases 
against the UGTT National Executive Committee, took the lead in the strike wave that 
peaked in 1977. The strikes subsided in 1978–80 due to the harsh repression that 
followed the general strike of 26 January 1978, but they picked up again in the early 
1980s. The strongholds of industrial militancy were SOEs like Bizerte’s ironworks El 
Fouladh, Sousse’s automobile factory STIA, Gabes’s chemical complex CM (Zeghidi 
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1997). Strikes in transport were also very common. The core demands revolved around 
the wage, and indeed real wages grew quickly, surpassing the rate of GDP growth (see 
Ben Romdhane 2011).  
The regime first made generous material concessions, but rising debt and the lack of hard 
currency pushed the government to prepare the way for a typical structural adjustment 
programme under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. In 1985, the authorities commenced increasingly heavy repression of the 
UGTT, involving attacks by unofficial militias on the union premises. Many militant 
rank-and-file trade unionists were laid off and senior UGTT leaders were jailed.  
It should be made clear that precarity was always a problem for the majority of Tunisian 
workers. However, this was to an extent alleviated under the ‘populist social pact’ built in 
the years following Independence in 1956. The expansion of the public sector and of 
industry, high growth rates, the rapid growth of a relatively generous welfare system and 
a protective legislative framework shielded a growing number of the population from the 
vagaries of the labour market and engendered widespread expectations that things would 
continue to improve. But the last decades saw an inversion or a weakening of all these 
tendencies (see Ben Romdhane 2011). What is new is not the existence of precarity but 
the weakening of the post-Independence trend towards increasing employment 
protections for broadening segments of the workforce. The memory of the former social 
pact deepens people’s frustrations and widens the gap between expectations and daily 
realities.  
Following a common pattern, the former strongholds of labour militancy were 
restructured, privatised, or abandoned to a slow decline. Between 1987 and 2010, 219 
SOEs were privatised (ITCEQ 2010). Total public employment (the public administration 
plus the SOEs) declined from 41% of wage-earners in 1980 (Zouari 1989, 339) to no 
more than 32% of wage-earners in 2010 (IMF 2014). While many SOEs survived, they 
needed fewer workers either because new machinery was introduced or because the lack 
of automation, coupled with free-trade agreements, made them less competitive, forcing 
them to cut production. The workplace unions in many SOEs became a shadow of 
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themselves and often participated in a widespread system of corrupt practices, especially 
in recruitment. In fact, employment in the public sector is seen in Tunisia as the way to 
economic security and upward social mobility, but in times of weak investment and fiscal 
crisis of the state this is an extremely oversubscribed hub of the labour market. A leftist 
militant from Kasserine who was interviewed is quite representative of public perceptions 
in his remarks on trade unionism in two major SOEs:  
It’s a shame, the cellulose factory is screwed for good. Before 2005 we used to have some 
very good militants there, it has a good history. [...] The cellulose and the CPG [phosphates 
mining SOE], they’re the same. It’s the corruption in hiring, in finance, in management, in 
production ... (Interview, Kasserine, 6 November 20157)  
The protagonists of the latest major cycle of struggles, which we can place in time from 
the beginning of the Gafsa Revolt for employment in January 2008 to the present day, 
were not relatively secure waged workers. State employees and manufacturing workers 
participated in the regional general strikes called by the UGTT at the height of the 2011 
Uprising and contributed to a new surge of strikes after Ben Ali’s downfall. However, the 
regional strikes were called as a result of pressure coming not from the factory shop floor, 
but from the streets outside.  
Since the Gafsa Revolt, the most prominent presence on the streets was that of precarious 
youth. While they were often backed by the UGTT left (whose power survived especially 
in the public administration), their very work conditions made it impossible for them to 
be union members and to use strikes as a weapon. The majority of them do not belong to 
any stable, formal organisation. While broadly left-wing ideas and sensibilities prevailed 
in the 1970s, the Tunisian left today has to compete with a strong Islamist movement, and 
both face very widespread ‘anti-politics’ feelings among the population. A stable left-
wing ideological and organisational presence among the precarious youth is ensured by 
the Union des diplomés chômeurs (UDC, or Union of Unemployed Graduates). But this 
organisation mostly represents unemployed graduates, who are only a fraction of the 
precarious.  
Roadblocks and riots are the precarious workers’ main tools for seeking concessions. 
	  	   13 
Less sensational than riots, roadblocks can produce greater economic damage and have 
the advantages of being more sustainable in time and of involving less risk of harm to the 
participants and to others. Because they halt the production of value from outside the 
workplace, roadblocks are effectively the strike of the workless. The latter can exploit 
logistical weak spots to clog the circulation of strategic commodities and as a 
consequence to slow down or stop production. But, unlike strikes, roadblocks are illegal, 
and therefore their practicability depends directly on the balance of power between 
protesters and law enforcement.  
These mobilisations are strongly impregnated with the protesters’ work ethic8 and their 
core demands revolve around secure employment and local development. Secure 
employment is often presented as a condition for dignity, and one of the most famous 
slogans of the 2011 Uprising was ‘Ettashghil istehqaq, ya issabat essoraq!’ 
(‘Employment is a right, you gang of thieves!’). However, one should not necessarily 
take this demand at face value – after all, what people primarily need is obviously the 
regular income coming from secure employment, and many protesters have been happy 
to accept public sector jobs in which they were reportedly not given much to do.  
The famous case of Mohamed Bouazizi, whose self-immolation was the trigger of the 
2011 Uprising, is extremely symbolic of the trends that have just been outlined. The 
young man was an agricultural labourer but he lost his job after the land where he worked 
was sold and production there restructured (Fautras 2015). The day that Bouazizi set 
himself ablaze, he had been harassed by the police while illegally selling vegetables on 
the street. Bouazizi’s trajectory can thus be read as an illustration of the general trend 
described above, in which losses in agricultural employment are not compensated by new 
jobs elsewhere, forcing many young people into desperately precarious work particularly 
in the low end of the service sector. In order to survive, the precarious have then to recur 
to individual ‘hustling’ or collective mobilisation. In January 2011, the latter met a 
rigidly crystallised authoritarian state-form, and brought it down due to the fact that the 
precarious were joined by other sectors of the population, including many secure workers 
and members of the middle class. But the Uprising could not invert the global trend 
towards precarisation. 
	  	   14 
No gas without secure employment and local development: The Kerkennah 
movement against Petrofac  
Arriving in Kerkennah from the mainland port of Sfax, the visitor cannot fail to notice the 
very basic state of the infrastructure, with the exception of the main road connecting the 
south-western port of Sidi Youssef to the north-eastern village of Alataya. That is the 
road used by the Petrofac trucks to transport the gas condensate out of the islands. The 
resident population is only about 15,500 inhabitants (INS 2016a), scattered among 13 
villages (the largest of these being Mellita, Alataya, and the capital Remla). According to 
the official statistics, the number of those in the islands in employment in 2014 was only 
4,373, but this conceals much informal work in and outside the household. The average 
age of 37 is five years higher than the national average. This is due to high emigration 
rates to the Tunisian mainland and to Europe. The Italian island of Lampedusa is only 
150 km away and many young Kerkennians have tried their luck on the dangerous trip. 
Figure 2 – Tunisia and the Kerkennah Islands 
 
Source: Sandro Montagner, Comunicazione Sostenibile. 
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There are two main energy companies operating in Kerkennah, Thyna Petroleum 
Services (TPS) and Petrofac. TPS is an oil joint venture between the Tunisian state-
owned Entreprise Tunisienne d’Activités Pétrolières (ETAP, the Tunisian Enterprise for 
Petroleum Activities) and the Austrian multinational OMV; its first site in Kerkennah has 
been active since 1985 (ETAP n.d.). Petrofac, on the other hand, is a Jersey-registered 
corporation, with revenue of US$6,844 million reported in 2015 (Petrofac 2015). Petrofac 
is currently under investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office for suspected bribery, 
corruption, and money laundering in a number of countries (SFO 2017). The corporation 
entered Tunisia in 2007 and started extracting gas in Kerkennah’s Chergui field in 2008. 
Chergui’s productive capacity is 850,000 normal cubic metres per day and 55% of the 
field’s revenues are devolved to ETAP.  
The relative poverty of the islands compared to the mass of wealth extracted by the rich 
foreign multinationals generates strong feelings of injustice among the population. 
Complaints that the vast majority of Kerkennians have never benefited from TPS and 
Petrofac’s presence are often heard. Based on the conversations and the interviews 
carried out during fieldwork, it seems clear that most inhabitants think that TPS and 
Petrofac should return some of their profits to the islands by contributing to local 
employment and development, particularly in view of the fact that extractive activities 
pollute the environment and damage fishing and tourism. Many also resent Petrofac’s 
opaque recruitment practices, especially during Ben Ali’s time. These were allegedly 
based on a patron-client network involving the ruling party and the local authorities.  
It is possible to identify four main social groups in relation to the Kerkennah movement: 
unemployed graduates, fishers, public administration employees, and Petrofac workers 
(direct and indirect). The unemployed graduates were the most prominent group 
mobilising against Petrofac. As the Tunisian private sector offers few jobs for people 
with educational qualifications relative to the supply of graduates, most unemployed 
graduates seek employment in the public sector. Both women and men participated, and 
the former were a majority of the 266 participants in the Petrofac-funded employment 
scheme (see below).  
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The organisation aiming to represent unemployed graduates is the UDC: its national 
leadership is leftist, but membership is open to all unemployed people. The spokesperson 
for UDC Kerkennah, Ahmed Souissi, is also a long-time left-wing activist. The 266 
participants in the employment scheme were all UDC members, but included all political 
tendencies, along with those completely disaffected with politics. Indeed, divisive 
political ideology and party membership tended to be strongly played down in favour of 
consensual local solidarity, especially given the attempts of some media and of the Prime 
Minister Habib Essid himself to underline the role of the leftist Front populaire and the 
Islamist Hizb Ut-Tahrir. The two parties have a presence on the islands and – unlike the 
governmental modernist and Islamist parties – they did support the Kerkennah movement 
from opposite sides, but unsurprisingly their members are small minorities. During the 
height of the mobilisations, the movement organised through village-level assemblies and 
delegates, and a general assembly in Remla. Social media were widely used for 
organisational and communicational purposes.  
Virtually all men on the islands are able to fish and do it more or less regularly depending 
on the extent to which they depend on it for their income. Fishers either own their boats 
or they share the product of their work with the owners of the boats they use. The 
‘boatless’ fishers are paid in cash by the boat owner for a quota of the product. The boat 
owner then sells the fish to local wholesalers, who sell it in turn to retail markets 
(normally in Sfax), food-processing factories, or restaurants. Small-scale fishing is a 
hard, dangerous, and insecure source of income. Just like the unemployed graduates, the 
fishers are not unified by the condition of being waged employees working in large 
groups under the same employers. But this lack of occupational cohesion is compensated 
within each category and between them by strong communal ties, as many unemployed 
graduates also fish, and all have fishers in their families.  
The fishers do not benefit from TPS and Petrofac’s presence on the archipelago and 
TPS’s occasional oil spills are very detrimental to the fishers’ work. Most of them 
vehemently agree that the energy firms should contribute to the development of the 
islands. They have often participated in the mobilisations, even if their role and the 
emphasis they placed on local development have been somewhat obscured by the 
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attention attracted by the unemployed graduates and their demand for employment. 
Mellita has a fishers’ union affiliated to the UGTT, but most fishers tend to organise on 
an informal basis.  
Public administration employees are the other large occupational group, and make up 
23% of the employed of Kerkennah (INS 2016a). They are the backbone of the UGTT. 
Despite an economy based on small-scale fishing, trade unionism has had an important 
role in the history of the islands. In fact, the main founders of the UGTT, Farhat Hached 
and Habib Achour, were Kerkennians who had migrated to the mainland, and up to the 
present day several UGTT national leaders have Kerkennian origins and maintain their 
ties to the islands.  
While public administration employees are certainly better off than the fishers and the 
unemployed graduates, they are linked to them by family and community ties and they do 
not benefit from Petrofac’s presence either. They mostly agree that the corporations 
should contribute to local employment and development. But the local UGTT, as is often 
said, was ‘between a rock and a hard place’ because it had to defend the interests of those 
of its members who depended on Petrofac for their work and at the same time had to 
respond to the opposite pressures from its base in the public administration and from the 
general population. The local UGTT had thus to mediate between the Petrofac workers 
and the precarious. Its position was that Petrofac should continue operating in Kerkennah 
and that illegal and violent methods should not be used by either side. However, it backed 
the demands of the movement against Petrofac by releasing official statements, 
participating in the negotiations, providing meeting places, and calling the 12 April 2016 
local general strike against repression (see below). Some among the interviewed accuse 
the UGTT of having made too many compromises with Petrofac in order to defend its 
members employed by the multinational, or of having prioritised employment in the 
public sector over the development of the archipelago (Interviews, Mellita, 20 November 
2016, and Mellita, 9 April 2017). The interviewed UGTT officials counter that the 
general strike and the pro-local development clauses of the agreements that were signed 
disprove these accusations (Interviews, Remla, 23 November 2016, Sfax, 25 November 
2016 and Remla, 10 April 2017).  
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The Petrofac employees and the security workers depend on the corporation’s presence 
on the islands for their employment, as it offers better wages and conditions than they 
could get elsewhere. Petrofac also has a convention with Kerkennah’s Grand Hotel that 
helps to keep it afloat during the low season, since Kerkennah is not a famous tourist 
destination. There is a UGTT union in all three workplaces. These workers faced strong 
contradictory pressures from Petrofac’s threats to leave Kerkennah on the one hand and 
their own grievances against Petrofac and their feelings of solidarity towards their fellow 
islanders on the other. A Petrofac trade unionist who was interviewed declared:  
There were a lot of Petrofac employees who were against the protesters and supported 
aggression against them. But we, the UGTT, we were against all aggression, it’s our family 
after all. (Interview, Sfax, 25 November 2016)  
The UGTT workplace unions of the Petrofac employees, the security workers and the 
Grand Hotel joined the general strike of 12 April 2016. A security worker and trade 
unionist emphatically confirmed: ‘We were first in line in the strike!’ (Interview, Remla, 
24 November 2016).  
Petrofac had been targeted by sporadic protests since its early years in Kerkennah, but 
only with the 2011 Uprising was it really forced to take the grievances of the population 
seriously. Kerkennah joined the Uprising on 12 January 2011, when the regional general 
strike was called by the Regional Executive Committee of the Sfax UGTT. On 14 
January 2011, clashes between the protesters and the police left one protester dead, the 
26-year-old Slim Hadhri. After Ben Ali’s departure, the local branch of the UDC was 
founded along with the Comité local de protection de la révolution (CLPR, the Local 
Committee for Protection of the Revolution). The CLPRs were participative local 
institutions that formed all over Tunisia after the retreat of the police, in order to protect 
the local communities and express their grievances.  
In the following weeks, groups of protesters started to hold sit-ins outside the local 
government offices and at the Petrofac field, blocking the trucks transporting the gas to 
the port of Sidi Youssef. In the post-Uprising context of political instability and 
widespread social mobilisations, the authorities and Petrofac itself were willing to make 
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concessions in order to keep the situation under some control. On 20 May 2011, after a 
series of negotiations, the Kerkennah CLPR, the regional Sfax UGTT and Petrofac signed 
an agreement at the governorate of Sfax. Petrofac would provide 600,000 Tunisian dinars 
(TDNs) per year (€303,000 at the time) to boost employment and development on the 
islands, it would directly hire 15 new workers, and it would buy some equipment for 
Kerkennah’s public administration.9 The agreement concluded by stating that other 
negotiations would follow to discuss a programme of local development for 2012, but the 
programme never really took off.  
Following the accord, an employment scheme was put in place in which Petrofac 
disbursed the money to the governorate that then forwarded it to 248 unemployed 
graduates belonging to the UDC. Their number increased to 266 in 2012, 153 of them 
women (Interview, Remla, 19 November 2016). The unemployed graduates were 
allocated to different public administration agencies on the islands. The beneficiaries 
were chosen according to the following criteria: residence in Kerkennah, year of 
graduation, marital status, and level of the degree. The number of beneficiaries from each 
village was determined proportionally to the size of its population. The beneficiaries 
holding a university degree (215) received TDN450 per month (€227 at the time), while 
those holding a high school degree (51) received TDN300 per month (€152 at the time) 
(Mekki 2016). It was however clear that the authorities and Petrofac saw this as a 
temporary arrangement. The 266 had no contract, no payslips, and no social security 
contributions. Indeed, the regularisation of their employment situation in the public 
administration became their main unmet demand, generating periodic protests.  
In March 2015, Petrofac declared its intention to stop funding the employment scheme. 
On 3 April 2015, Imed Derouich, Petrofac’s CEO in Tunisia at the time, intervened on 
Radio Express FM (2015) arguing that the majority of the beneficiaries of the 
employment scheme did not really work in return for their wages (which would blur the 
distinction between ‘wage’ and ‘unemployment subsidy’). The unemployed graduates set 
up a new roadblock, halting production on the site from 10 March 2015 to 16 April 2015, 
when a new agreement between the UDC, the UGTT and Petrofac was signed. Petrofac 
would keep funding the employment scheme until the end of 2015. In the meantime, the 
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governorate would establish an ‘environmental firm’ on the model of the employment 
schemes created after the Uprising in other marginalised regions. This public firm would 
regularly hire the 266 and keep them allocated to the various public administration 
agencies of the islands. But in January 2016 the authorities did not implement the 
agreement and thus the conflict turned into a deadlock.  
On 19 January 2016, the unemployed graduates started a new roadblock outside the 
Petrofac field, halting production once again. Fresh negotiations began, but this time the 
authorities and Petrofac were not willing to back down. In the meantime, gangs of thugs 
unsuccessfully tried to harass and attack the protesters. An interviewed female activist 
mentioned that: ‘Everybody [taking part in the movement] was harassed but there were 
attempts to insult and terrorise the women specifically, although they resisted well’ 
(Interview, Remla, 22 November 2016). On 3 April 2016, the word spread that a large 
number of riot police were aboard the public transport ferry from Sfax to Kerkennah. For 
security reasons, the unemployed graduates decided to move the roadblock from the 
Petrofac field to the village of Mellita. During the night, at least 500 riot police attacked 
the roadblock with tear gas and two water cannons. According to my interviews and to 
some news reports, the police hardly discriminated between protesters and the general 
population, insulting and attacking anybody they found in their way. This massive 
display of force was taken as a provocation by many inhabitants, especially the fishers, 
who joined the fray even if they had not been part of the original roadblock. The Mellita 
roadblock reassembled soon after its dispersal, while the riot police maintained its 
presence on the islands and made four arrests. The Ligue tunisienne des droits de 
l’homme (LTDH, the Tunisian League for Human Rights) denounced several violations, 
including the torture in police custody of at least one of those arrested.10  
This situation of stasis continued for several days, with no progress towards a resolution 
of the conflict, until 8 April 2016, when the UGTT declared a local general strike to be 
held on 12 April 2016 calling for the liberation of those arrested and resumption of the 
negotiations to satisfy the demands of the movement. The strike was successful, and 
many of the population and local businesses participated. As noted above, the strikers 
included the workplace unions of the Petrofac employees and security workers.  
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On 14 April 2016, a new round of negotiations took place in the Sfax governorate 
between the representatives of the local and regional UGTT, the governor, and the police. 
Mohamed Ali Arous, the Kerkennah local UGTT secretary general, obtained a deadline 
of 24 hours to propose an agreement to the protesters. However, the police did not respect 
the 24-hour ‘truce’ and on the same evening it forcibly let the Petrofac trucks through 
from the port of Sidi Youssef to the gas field. Who gave the order remains unknown up to 
today. Tension had mounted in the former ten days and it eventually exploded. Riots 
against the police broke out all over Kerkennah. On the same night, protesters at the 
mainland port of Sfax set up a block to prevent police reinforcements from leaving for 
the islands. On 15 April 2016, the clashes picked up again until the police were cornered 
in the port of Sidi Youssef without any escape route. The protesters organised to let the 
police get the boat back to Sfax without anybody getting seriously hurt. Four police 
vehicles were burnt and one was thrown into the sea.  
After the April crisis, the situation returned to deadlock. The police were not allowed 
back on the islands, Petrofac remained closed even in the absence of a physical 
roadblock, and no negotiations took place. Despite media reports mainly presenting 
Kerkennah as a land of chaos and potential terrorist activity, there was no major disorder. 
On 2 June 2016, Tunisia’s president, Beji Caid Essebsi, announced an initiative to 
dissolve the incumbent executive and form a ‘national unity government’, including 
representatives of the UGTT, to address the economic crisis of the country. It was 
therefore useless to negotiate under a government soon to expire.  
On 20 August 2016, the national unity government was announced. The new minister of 
social affairs was Mohamed Trabelsi, formerly a UGTT leader from Sfax. When, in early 
September 2016, Petrofac announced again that it was leaving Kerkennah, Trabelsi 
brokered an agreement that was signed on 23 September 2016. The text of the new 
agreement listed larger concessions than the previous ones. The 50 unemployed with a 
high school degree would be hired in a newly created firm with a donated capital of 
TDN2.5 million (about €1 million at the time) that would then have to become financially 
self-sufficient. The remaining unemployed would be regularly hired in the local public 
administration in three tranches between 2017 and 2019. ETAP, Petrofac, and TPS would 
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provide TDN1.5 million per year (€607,000 at the time) to cover their wages. 
Additionally, the energy firms would disburse TDN3.5 million per year (about €1.4 
million at the time) for local development projects, and a local committee would be 
created to decide on the allocation of these funds.11 The agreement also listed the first 
projects that would be supported, including the construction of a new port in Sidi 
Youssef. All charges against the protesters would be dropped and the energy firms would 
be allowed to operate normally. In the following days, the police returned to Kerkennah 
and Petrofac resumed production after a blockade that had lasted eight months.  
The agreement, if implemented – which is far from certain – will probably lead to better 
standards of living for the population of the archipelago. The situation remains very 
uncertain. Some of the first deadlines were not respected, which prompted a hard-line 
group of protesters not organised by the UDC to stage a new roadblock, which stopped 
Petrofac again from December 2016 to May 2017. On 24 May, just a few days before the 
beginning of Ramadan, Petrofac restarted production with army protection in place.  
Arrests were made among the participants in the last block. The struggle over the 
distribution of the revenues coming from the islands’ natural resources seems to be still 
unsettled.  
This empirical account, with all its local specificities, is in several respects representative 
of the global trends described in the theoretical section of this article: the most productive 
sectors of the Kerkennian economy are highly capital intensive and require a very low 
number of workers, and a large part of the population lives off various kinds of 
precarious employment while being mostly excluded from the gains generated by high-
tech production. Moreover, the facts are consistent with the autonomist feminist insight 
that the realm of social reproduction, the community, can become a site of struggle 
hindering the accumulation of capital. The people who took part in the mobilisations 
were relatively fragmented on an occupational level, with no large groups working for the 
same employers. However, despite the different interpretations of the events, the vast 
majority was at least temporarily united in an oppositional stance towards Petrofac and 
against the intervention of the riot police. What compensated for occupational 
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fragmentation was the communal solidarity of a small island population facing a wealthy 
foreign multinational that employed only a handful of local workers. Virtually all 
interviewees underlined their identity as Kerkennians first of all, and emphasised their 
commitment to the well-being of the islands, noting that ‘everyone knows each other’ and 
everybody is linked by family and community relations. The pressures towards class 
decomposition generated by employment precarity and dispersion were more than 
counterbalanced by a recomposition centred on notions of community belonging. As 
UDC’s Ahmed Souissi said:  
Being the inhabitants of an island, with the boats connecting us to the mainland only between 
6 am and 6.30 pm and then we’re isolated from the rest of the world. ... This creates a kind of 
special mentality. We told the prefect and the governor never to consider the use of force, 
because it would turn the whole island upside down ... even if we were only about 150 
people, far away from the villages, at the Petrofac field. Even those Kerkennians who were 
openly against us, like the Petrofac workers or some hotel owners, they will switch to our 
side in order to defend the island. (Interview, Remla, 21 November 2016)  
 
Conclusion  
The precarious youth and the demands for secure employment and local development are 
at the core of the Tunisian cycle of struggles that can be said to have started in 2008 with 
the Gafsa Revolt and that continues to the present day. As shown in the theoretical 
section, these mobilisations are rooted in the rise of the global surplus population. The 
Kerkennah movement against Petrofac is part of this broader cycle of struggles, and it 
revolves around the same core subjects and demands. Consistent with autonomist 
feminism, another frequent feature is the importance of communal solidarities in the 
struggles of the precarious youth across the marginal regions, as shown by village- and 
neighbourhood-based organisation at the high points of the mobilisations. But this 
importance is particularly marked in Kerkennah due to the relative isolation of the 
islands.  
Communal solidarities compensate for the lack of occupational cohesion and for the 
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weakness of formal organisations (with the relative exception of the UGTT, which 
however is by definition unable to function as a stable organisation for the precarious 
youth). Communal solidarity is not incompatible with class solidarity. Indeed, Tunisia’s 
geographically uneven path of development has led to a certain internal intersection of 
class and locality. In 2010–11, and to a lesser extent in January 2016, local struggles 
circulated across the country through a discourse of social justice and opposition to the 
political and economic elites.  
Communal solidarity, however, is not unproblematic as a medium of class recomposition. 
While, in the 1970s, recomposition based on labour struggles in the workplace was more 
directly in line with progressive egalitarian aspirations, the current recomposition based 
on community ties is fragile and politically ambivalent, as it can swing in disparate 
directions depending on a host of contextual factors. Neither the left nor the Islamist right 
are likely to win the battle for cultural hegemony.  
Now that the 2011 Uprising has at least achieved basic civil and political rights, the 
question of what organisational forms could put down roots in local communities to give 
some degree of continuity to the struggles of the precarious is timelier than ever. A 
difficulty specific to the region is, of course, the influence of the oil-rich Gulf countries 
that supply significant support to the efforts of the Islamist right to penetrate working 
class communities, exacerbating the sectarian dimensions into which social anger can be 
channelled. And yet, it was precisely in this region that some of the most courageous 
struggles for dignity and social justice of our time took place. The (hi)story that found a 
new beginning in 2008 is far from being concluded. 
 
Notes  
1. Translated from French by the author.   
2. Immaterial labour refers to work that results in immaterial products: information, 
knowledges, ideas, relationships, affects. Typical examples of eminently 
immaterial labour are the creative industries or care work. The concept of 
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immaterial labour is central in the ‘neo-workerist’ strand of autonomism led by 
authors like Antonio Negri, Maurizio Lazzarato, and Paolo Virno. These authors 
claim that immaterial labour is the most vital form of labour to contemporary 
capitalism and that the immaterial aspect of work exercises hegemony over all 
other forms of work.   
3. This is also why unemployment statistics for countries without unemployment 
subsidies are virtually useless for our purposes.   
4. The following figures were calculated using the database created by Monji Ben 
Chaabane for his study La rémunération des salariés, 1989-2014 (Ben Chaabane 
2014).   
5. The statistics presented here are for the function publique, which is a subset of the 
public sector, meaning employees of ministries, local administrations, schools, 
hospitals, police, army, etc. I have therefore used the term ‘public administration’ 
in this article, rather than ‘public sector’, as the latter also includes workers of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs): many SOEs are industrial firms, and employment 
there is thus categorised as ‘industrial employment’ in the statistics that I have 
used.   
6. There are also about 30 administrative employees in Sfax and 100 in Tunis, according 
to the same source.   
7. This and other interviews in the text were conducted in French and translated by the 
author.   
8. This is also confirmed by Ben Amor and Moussa’s (2015) research on the attitudes 
towards  work and unemployment of the youth of Tunis’s working class 
banlieues.   
9. Minutes of the meeting that took place in Sfax on 20 May 2011 between the 
representatives of  the Kerkennah CLPR, the regional Sfax UGTT, and Petrofac.   
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10. LTDH statements of 7 April 2016 and 10 April 2016.   
11. ‘I’elan mushtarak lil-mabadi hawl attanmia bi-jazira Kerkennah istinaf sharika 
Petrofac li-nashatiha al-eadi’ (‘Joint declaration on the principles for the 
development of the Kerkennah’). 
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